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COMMENTS
The Constitutional Significance of
Racially Disproportionate Impact
I.

Introduction

Since the passage of the fourteenth amendment' the United States
Supreme Court has struggled with the issue of what constitutes unlawful
racial discrimination. In terms of equal protection analysis, the Court has
determined that classifications based on race are "suspect" 2 and, as such,
are subject to review under a "strict scrutiny standard." 3 While the
applicable standard of review is usually clear, 4 the required showing of
discrimination that justifies the imposition of the test is an area that has
undergone difficult transitions. Allocating the burden of proof and defining the elements necessary for a prima facie case are the primary issues.
In determining the constitutionality of.governmental decisions the
Court has traditionally examined both legislative motivation and the
effect of the challenged action. When it has focused on the effect of the
action the Court has utilized a disproportionate impact analysis. As its
name indicates, the analysis requires a showing that the government
action has a disproportionate impact (i.e., the burden or benefit falls
more heavily on one class of persons than on another). Such disparity
constitutes a prima facie case that the defendant must rebut with evidence
that his actions were in fact justified. In some instances, the Court has
gone so far as to find disproportionate impact alone unconstitutional.
Recently, however, the United States Supreme Court has undermined the disproportionate impact doctrine 5 and advocated the expansion
of judicial inquiry into purpose, intent, or motive behind the governmental decisions. Not only did the Court renounce the use of disproportionate
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I provides in pertinent part: "[No state shall] deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
2. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
3. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
4. It would appear, however, that classifications based on race or ethnic origin that
are of a benign character are subject only to the less strict "rational basis" test. E.g., Lau v.
Nicholas, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
5. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). See notes 93-108 and accompanying text infra.

impact to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination, 6 but it
declared that this had never been the standard. Despite the Court's denial,
case law indicates that the disproportionate impact doctrine plays a
significant role in establishing racial discrimination. This is evidenced not
only by the Supreme Court's own language, but by numerous lower court
decisions that have interpreted the high court's position. This comment
will examine the past importance of the doctrine, the changes it has
undergone, and its present importance in establishing racial discrimination.
II.
A.

The Disproportionate Impact Analysis
DisproportionateEffect EstablishingRacial Discrimination

1. Evolution of the DisproportionateImpact Analysis. -Because
racially dependent governmental decisions are often concealed and courts
are reluctant to inquire into legislative purpose, 7 disproportionate impact
has been utilized to prove that ostensibly nondiscriminatory action is in
fact racially motivated. Particularly conducive to such an analysis are
voter redistricting cases. After the passage of the fifteenth amendment, 8
which guaranteed the right to vote regardless of race, several southern
states began to devise schemes to deny Negroes this right. Among these
contrivances was the gerrymandering of voting districts. 9 In Gomillion v.
Lightfoot,1" the United States Supreme Court invoked the fifteenth
amendment to strike down a voter redistricting scheme that appeared
neutral on its face, but was statistically demonstrated to be discriminatory. The Alabama Legislature had changed the boundaries of Tuskegee,
l
Alabama "from a square to an uncouth twenty-eight sided figure,""
thereby excluding virtually all black voters, but not a single white voter,
from the city limits. The Court unanimously reversed the district court's
dismissal of the case, recognizing that if the claims were proved,
6. The doctrine continues to play a significant role in the disposition of Title VII
employment cases. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
7. Among the reasons advanced for this hesitation are: the difficulty of ascertaining
intent, the fear that judicial inquiry into purpose might lead legislators to become more
secretive about the legislative process, and the possibility that a law invalidated solely
because of its illegal purpose will be re-enacted for the proper reasons. See Palmer v.
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971); Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem
of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SuP. CT. REV. 95 (1971); Ely, Legislative and
Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970); Samford,
Toward a Constitutional Definition of Racial Discrimination, 25 EMORY L.J. 509 (1976).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. "The right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state on account of race, color or
previous condition of servitude."
9. Other contrivances congested the Supreme Court's docket in the years preceding
the enactment of the fifteenth amendment. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915)
(grandfather clauses); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915) (grandfather clause); Lane v.
Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939) (procedural hurdles); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944)
(white primary); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (racial gerrymandering);
Alabama v. United States, 371 U.S. 37 (1962) (discriminatory application of voting tests).
10. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
11. Id. at 340.

the conclusion would be irresistible, tantamount for all practical
purposes to a mathematical demonstration, that the legislation
is solely concerned with segregating white and colored voters
by fencing Negro citizens out of town so as to deprive them of
their preexisting municipal vote. 2
In a later decision 3 the Court reaffirmed the "effect" doctrine 4 and
pointed out that,
[Gomillion stands] not for the proposition that legislative motive is a proper basis for declaring a statute unconstitutional,
but that the inevitable effect of a statute neutral on its face may
render it unconstitutional. [T]he Court sustained a complaint
which, if true, established that the 'inevitable effect'.

. .

of the

redrawing of municipal boundaries was to deprive the petitioners of their right to vote for no reason other than they were

Negro . . . [T]he purpose of the legislation was irrelevant,

because the inevitable effect-the necessary 'scope and operation'.

. .

abridged constitutional rights.'

The constitutionality of multi-member districts' 6 was determined by
a showing that they were neither designed to nor "would operate to
minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements
of the voting population."' 7 In the 1970's the Court undertook the
difficult task of scrutinizing the impact of multi-member districting
schemes. In Whitcomb v. Chavis' s the Court applied a test premised on
the minimization or cancellation of voting strength, but found that the
plaintiffs had failed to make the requisite showing of an adverse effect on
minority voting strength. Interpreting the Court's test, Justice Douglas in
his dissent concluded that "a showing of racial motivation is not necessary when dealing with multi-member districts .

.

.

. [T]he test

.

.

.

is

whether there are invidious effects."19
The Douglas' approach was applied two years later in White v.
Regester,20 a case that challenged a Texas redistricting scheme. A unanimous Court struck down two multi-member districts on the grounds
that black and Mexican-American minorities were effectively excluded
from the political process. The Court assigned plaintiffs the heavy burden
12. Id. at 341.
13. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
14. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971), in which the Court said, "But
the focus in those cases [Gomillion] was on the actual effect of the enactments, not upon the
motivation which led the States to behave as they did." (Emphasis added).
15. 391 U.S. 367, 384-85 (emphasis in original). For a further discussion of Gomillion
and the constitutional ramifications of gerrymandering, see, e.g., Clinton, Further Explorations in the Political Thicket: The Gerrymander and the Constitution, 59 IOWA L. REV. 1
(1973); Edwards, Gerrymander and "One Man, One Vote," 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 879 (1971);
Note, Political Gerrymandering: A Statutory Compactness Standard as an Antidote for
Judicial Impotence, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 398 (1974).
16. Multi-member districts may be defined as districts represented by two or more
legislators elected at large by the voters of the district.
17. Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966)(citing Forston v. Dorsey, 379 U.S.
433,439 (1965)).
18. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
19. Id. at 177 (Douglas, J.,dissenting).
20. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).

of proving less opportunity to participate, but did not require proof of
discriminatory intent. 21 Although it did not imply that the multi-member
districts had been discriminatorily designed, the Court did note that both
22
counties had histories of discrimination.
Challenges to jury selection procedures represent another area in
which statistical and documentary evidence alone is frequently sufficient
to raise a rebuttable inference of discrimination. 23 The "effect" analysis
is used in jury cases because of the obvious ease with which the court can
ascertain the effect of the selection procedures. 24 In Eubanks v. Louisiana 25 the Supreme Court examined a jury selection system that resulted in
the exclusion of virtually all Negroes from jury panels. Reviewing a black
defendant's indictment by an all white grand jury, the Court maintained,
We are reluctantly forced to conclude that the uniform and long
continued exclusion of Negroes from grand juries shown by
this record cannot be attributed to chance, to accident, or to the
fact that no sufficiently qualified Negroes have ever been included in the lists submitted to the various local judges. It
seems clear to us that Negroes have been
26 consistently barred
from jury service because of their race.
Similarly, in Alexander v. Louisiana,7 the Supreme Court held that
the plaintiffs, by showing the systematic exclusion of Negroes from
juries, had established a prima facie case of racial discrimination. The
"burden of proof [then] shift[ed] to the state to rebut the presumption of
unconstitutional action by showing that permissible racially neutral selection criteria and procedures have produced the monochromatic result.' '28
21. The plaintiffs' burden is to produce evidence to support a finding that the
political processes leading to nomination and election were not equally open to
participation by the group in question-that its members had less opportunity than
did other residents in the district to participate in the political processes and to elect

legislators of their choice.
Id. at 766.
22. The Court stated,
The District Court . . . did not hold that every racial or political group has a
constitutional right to be represented in the state legislature, but did. . . conclude
that the multimember district as designed and operated in Bexar County, invidiously excluded Mexican-Americans from effective participation in political
life. . . . [We] are not inclined to overturn these findings, representing as they do
a blend of history and an intensly local appraisal of the design and import of the
Bexar County multimember district ....
Id. at 769-70. For a more extensive discussion of the significance of a finding of a history of
discrimination, see notes 29-34 and accompanying text infra.
23. See, e.g., Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370(1880); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587
(1935); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967). See
also Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
24. E.g., Carter v. Jury Commission, 396 U.S. 320 (1970), in which the Court affirmed
the ruling of a three-judge district court that blacks, who constituted sixty-five percent of
the population but only thirty-two percent of the jury rolls, had been unconstitutionally
excluded. For a general discussion of the jury selection problem and an "effect" analysis of
the issue, see Finkelstein, The Application of Statistical Decision Theory to the Jury
DiscriminationCases, 80 HARV. L. REV. 338 (1966).

25. 356 U.S. 584 (1958).
26. Id. at 587-88.
27. 405 U.S. 625 (1972).
28. Id. at 632. The Fifth Circuit has held that states must design their procedures for
the selection of criminal juries to insure a cross-section and invalidated procedures-

2. The Significance of a History of Discrimination- Something
less than proof of purposeful discrimination is required to establish a
prima facie case when there is a finding of past discrimination. If a state
historically discriminated against a racial group, it cannot adopt a reapportionment scheme that in effect dilutes that group's political power. A
finding of unequal educational opportunities because of past racial discrimination also relieves the plaintiff of the burden of showing intent to
discriminate. 29
Evidence of a history of discrimination often takes the form of
previous legislative enactments. Following the Supreme Court's rejection
of a discriminatory literacy test, 30 the Oklahoma Legislature enacted
another provision that required those not registered to vote to do so within
a twelve-day period or lose the right forever. Because the majority of
unregistered voters were Negro, the Court found that this statute also had
an impermissible effect and thus declared it unconstitutional in Lane v.
Wilson 31
An Alabama voter registration statute that required that those wishing to register be able to "understand and explain" any article of the
Federal Constitution also ran afoul of constitutional guarantees. 32 Not
only had proponents of the amendment touted the provision as a means of
preventing Negroes from exercising their franchise, but, more importantly, the enactment had an adverse disproportionate effect on Negroes. The
district court relied on both the fourteenth 33 and fifteenth amendments to
invalidate the provision, and the Supreme Court summarily affirmed,
34
citing Lane.
regardless of whether they were racially motivated-that disproportionately excluded
blacks. Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 992 (1967).
29. In Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969), the Supreme Court
refused to allow a South Carolina county to reinstate its voter literacy test, which had been
suspended under the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Even assuming that the test had been
administered fairly and the county's purposes were nondiscriminatory, the Court nevertheless felt that the test would have the impermissible effect of disadvantaging black adults who
as children may have attended the county's segregated and inferior schools. Justice Harlan,
writing for the Court, reasoned that the "impartial' administration of the literacy test today
would serve only to perpetuate these inequities in a different form." Id. at 297.
30. The Oklahoma legislature had passed a voter registration law that required a
registrant to pass a literacy test that exempted those who were registered before January 1,
1866. Since this date was prior to the adoption of the fifteenth amendment, the law had the
obvious effect of requiring almost all Negroes, but virtually no whites, to pass the literacy
test. The United States Supreme Court invalidated the provision in Guinn v. United States
238 U.S. 347 (1915).
31. 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
32. Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala.), aff'd per curiam, 336 U.S. 933
(1949).
33. The Court apparently relied on fourteenth amendment grounds because of the
vague standards which the voting officials were expected to apply. It found that these
standards permitted arbitrary action and were thus violative of the equal protection clause.
34. The Court also cited Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). This case contested the validity of a municipal ordinance that in effect denied Chinese laundry operators
official permission to do business while non-Chinese operators remained unmolested. Yick
Wo is often cited for the proposition that a statute, neutral on its face, may be found
unconstitutional if administered in a discriminatory fashion.

3. Focus on Possible Effects. -In some instances the Supreme
Court has even further lightened the plaintiff's burden of proof in racial
discrimination cases by requiring only a showing of possible adverse
effects on a minority group. Looking beyond the face of the law to its
possible effects the High Court struck down an amendment to the Akron
city charter that required that ordinances regulating realty transactions on
the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or ancestry first be
approved by a majority of electors. 35 The city had previously passed a
Fair Housing Ordinance that now had to be approved by referendum. The
Court found that the referendum requirement discriminated on the basis
of race because housing ordinances not dealing with discrimination were
free of the requirement. Thus, an additional burden was on those ordinances dealing with discrimination, thereby making it more unlikely that
they would be passed. 36 Justice White, writing for the majority, considered the effect of the amendment on minorities. In finding the provision unconstitutional, he concluded, "although the law on its face treats
Negro and white, Jew and gentile in an identical manner, the reality is
that the law's impact falls on the minority. The majority needs no
protection against discrimination. . . .,37
Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 38 a circuit court decision, represents the
lower courts' interpretation of the disproportionate impact analysis .3 9 The
35. Hunter v. Erikson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969). Justices Harlan and Stewart filed concurring opinions in which they claimed the amendment was discriminatory on its face. Justice
Black dissented,

stating, "I

. . . protest . . . against [the Court's] use of the Equal

Protection Clause to bar States from repealing law that the Court wants the States to
retain." Id.at 396-97 (Black, J., dissenting).
36. See also Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Org. v. City of Union City, 424 F.2d
291 (9th Cir. 1970). A referendum was required for zoning clearance to build a low income
housing project. The Court found that the impermissible effect of the action was to deny
minority members integrated housing.
37. 393 U.S. at 391. This statement is interesting in view of Justice White's later
position in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976). There he asserted that "Respondents, as Negroes, could no more successfully claim that the test denied them equal protection than could white applicants who also failed." It would seem that, in terms of protection
from discrimination, being a member of a minority is no longer significant.
38. 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), aff'd on rehearing en banc, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir.
1972).
39. See also Pride v. Community School Bd., 482 F.2d 257, 267 (2d Cir. 1973) ("the
Supreme Court has made it clear that it is the effect of state action that is to control a claim
for relief under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."); Williams v.
Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1974); Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School
Dist., 467 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 922 (1973); Kennedy Park Homes
Ass'n. v.City of Lackawana,436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971);
Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968); United
States ex rel. Seal v. Wimon, 304 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1962); Child v. Beame, 412 F. Supp. 593
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.) aff'd, 423 U.S. 963 (1975);
Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir.
1972). For a more detailed discussion of the issue of equal distribution of government
benefits, see Anderson, Toward the Equalization of Municipal Services: Variation on a
Theme of Hawkins, 50 J. URB. L. 177 (1972); Fessler & Haer, Beyond the Wrong Side of the
Tracks: Municipal Services in the Interests of Procedure, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 441
(1972); Note, Equalization of Municipal Services: The Economics of Serano and Shaw, 82
YALE L.J. 89 (1972).

court sustained the plaintiffs' complaint that municipal services had been
provided in a racially discriminatory manner. In a concurring opinion,
Judge Wisdom cited United States Supreme Court decisions, 4 and concluded that "[t]o imply that proof of motive, purpose or intent is necessary to establish a basis for relief in a case such as this is to misstate the
clear and unambiguous law on the subject.' '41
B.

The HistoricalContext-Ultimate Effect Test
The historical context-ultimate effect test, a version of the disproportionate impact test, is employed to determine whether state action results
in the perpetuation of segregation in violation of the fourteenth amendment. The test has been utilized most frequently in the housing area. The
court first views the challenged ordinance in its historical context, focusing on statistical data that reveals a significant number of minorities
within the affected group, a history of segregated housing within the
immediate and surrounding area, and presently existing segregated housing. If such a pattern of segregation emerges, it then applies the "ultimate
effect" portion of the test to determine the impact of the ordinance. When
an ordinance either imposes a greater burden on a minority group than on
all others similarly situated or is applied so as to create such a result, 42 a
racially discriminatory effect exists. Thus, when a regulation operates to
limit the access of minorities to opportunities available to the majority,
the court will find that the racially discriminatory effect violates the equal
protection clause.
The Supreme Court explicitly approved the use of the historical
context-ultimate effect test when it affirmed the California Supreme
Court's decision in Reitman v. Mulkey. 43 California had passed a constitutional amendment that resulted in the repeal of two state laws prohibiting racial discrimination in the sale of housing. The California
Supreme Court found that the legislature had previously acted to prohibit
racial discrimination in housing by passing several fair housing acts. In
enacting such legislation, the court reasoned, the lawmaking body recognized the existence of racial discrimination and its responsibility for
fashioning a remedy. Because the immediate design of the amendment
was to overturn state laws that limited the right of private sellers and
lessors to discriminate, the impermissible ultimate effect of the enactment
was the revitalization of discrimination in housing.' The Supreme Court
accepted the reasoning of the California court and affirmed the decision. 45
40. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971); Griffin v. County School Bd.,.377 U.S.
218 (1964); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Brown v. Board of Education, 349
U.S. 294 (1955); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
41. 461 F.2d at 1174 (Wisdom, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
42. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
43. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
44. Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d 529, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881, 413 P.2d 825 (1966).
45. 387 U.S. at 381. The dissent, written by Justice Harlan, with Justices Black, Clark,
and Stewart joining, found the statute neutral on its face and concluded that its repeal was

The historical context-ultimate effect test has often been invoked in
cases that challenge a municipality's decision to prohibit the building of a
low income housing project by a private developer. 4 6 Plaintiffs must first
offer proof of a past history of racial discrimination in housing within the
city or adjoining urban areas and then produce statistical evidence to
show that the anticipated occupants of the proposed project would have
been members of a minority. Once the "ultimate effect" of discrimination against minorities is established, the burden of proof shifts to the
municipality to show that there is a compelling governmental interest
47
justifying its actions.
The perpetuation of segregation in housing supported a finding of
unconstitutional discrimination in a series of cases culminating in the
Supreme Court's decision in Hills v. Gautreaux.4 8 Black applicants for
public housing brought separate actions against the Chicago Housing
Authority 49 and the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development 5°
charging that they had maintained racially discriminatory policies. The
practice by the local authority of requiring the approval of local aldermen
no more unconstitutional than if the state did not have any anti-discrimination statutes at all.

Id. at 382.

46. See, e.g., United States v. City of Blackjack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975), a case in which the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that
the City, which was virtually all white, hastily passed a zoning ordinance prohibiting new
multiple family dwellings when it became known that there were plans to build a low and
moderate income housing project within its limits. Concluding that this ordinance would
have the effect of preventing eighty-five percent of the blacks in St. Louis from obtaining
housing in Blackjack, the court enjoined enforcement of the ordinance. The court held that
plaintiffs need only prove that the defendants' acts actually or predictably result in racial
discrimination and need not show racial motivation. Emphasizing the significance of a
finding of discriminatory effect, the court said,
Effect and not motivation is the touchstone, in part because clever men may
easily conceal their motivation, but more importantly because 'whatever our law
was once, we now firmly recognize that the arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness
can be as disastrous and unfair to private rights and the public interest as the
perversity of a wilful scheme.' Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 497 (D.D.C.
1967).
Id. at 1185. The action was brought under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1968).
47. Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawana, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971) (city rezoned area to prevent construction of low income
housing project that would be occupied by blacks); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037
(10th Cir. 1970) (refusal to rezone and issue building permits for construction of private low
income housing apartments in midst of area already zoned for apartments held racially
motivated); Bank v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 1972), modified, 473 F.2d 910 (6th
Cir. 1973) (city revoked building permits issued for low income housing in predominantly
white areas of city); Sisters of Providence v. City of Evanston, 335 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Ill.
1971) (refusal to rezone); Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd per
curiam, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972) (after county rezoned land for apartments and plaintiffs
purchased property and made known their intention to build low rent housing, county
officials refused to issue building permits).
48. 425 U.S. 284 (1976). For a more extensive analysis of this complex litigation, see,
e.g., Comment, Gautreaux v. Public Housing Authority: Equal Protection and Public
Housing, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 437 (1970); Note, Public Housing and Urban Policy: Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 79 YALE L.J. 712 (1970).
49. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. II1. 1969), aff'd, 436
F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 922 (1971).
50. Gautreaux v. Secretary of Housing & Urban Dev., 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971).

before the construction of low-income housing in their ward was invalidated because the building of new projects only in black neighbor51
hoods reinforced the existing pattern of racial segregation in Chicago.
In the suit against HUD the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals sustained
the plaintiffs' complaint, which alleged that HUD's policies also resulted
in the building of low income projects in black neighborhoods. 52 Once the
impermissible effect of the agency's action was shown, the circuit court
explained that purposeful intent to discriminate was not necessary and,
furthermore, that good faith was no defense. 53 The Supreme Court's
affirmance of the findings of both courts reinforced the theory that the
interested in an "effect" analysis for equal protecCourt was primarily
4
tion claims.
C. The Application of the DisproportionateImpact Analysis to School
Desegregation Cases; the De Facto-De Jure Dichotomy
The Court has gone full circle in school desegregation cases with its
requirements for the showing of an intent to discriminate. In the early
cases the Court required a showing of purposeful discrimination, most
often found in legislative mandates to segregate. Later, when the Court
examined northern school districts, it began to focus on the "effect" of
school segregation. Finally, in its most recent decisions the Court has
retreated by once again requiring that those disproportionately and adversely affected also demonstrate that the challenged actions were made
with a purpose to discriminate.
Following .the Supreme Court's landmark school desegregation decision in Brown v. Board of Education,55 the courts have struggled to
define the permissible scope of the judiciary's power to compel school
integration. Overruling the "separate but equal" doctrine the Court had
previously espoused, 5 6 a unanimous Court declared that "[s]eparate edu51. 296 F. Supp. at 915. The district court found that the "effect" of such policies was
in violation of the fourteenth amendment, and the court of appeals affirmed, 436 F.2d at
313. See also United Farmworkers of Florida Housing Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach,
493 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1974) (city's housing policies would have ultimately resulted in the
confinement of low income housing construction to the segregated area of the city. The
Court found the segregation would be reinforced and, thus, declared the policies illegal).
52. The district court complaint in this action was filed with Gautreaux v. Chicago
Housing Authority. The district court dismissed the complaint on procedural grounds and
the court of appeals reversed.
53. HUD had attempted to justify its actions by showing that it had acted in good
faith. Rejecting that argument, the court posited that
It]he reason for courts' near uniform refusal to examine purported good faith
motives behind alleged discriminatory acts was perhaps most succinctly put by
the Supreme Court in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725,
81 S. Ct. 856, 861, 6 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1963): 'it is of no consolation to an individual
denied the equal protection of the laws that it was done in good faith.'
448 F.2d at 738.
54. 425 U.S. at 306.
55. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter referred to as Brown I].
56. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). The case dealt with the de jure segregation of train passengers.

cational facilities are inherently unequal." 57 The following year in Brown
I58 the Court handed down the remedial requirements for the implementation of the Brown decision. The Court announced that "[aill provisions
of federal, state or local law requiring or permitting

.

.

.

discrimination

must yield to [the principles stated in Brown fl.""
The Brown opinions have prompted major debate on the issue of
whether only the existence of a segregatory mandate in the form of a legal
provision or other governmental action constitutes a denial of equal
protection, or whether a mere segregatory effect is sufficient. This is in
essence the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation. Conditions brought about by segregatory mandates constitute de jure segregation, while segregatory conditions resulting from neighborhood conditions are labeled de facto. While the mandates of de jure segregation are
generally held unconstitutional, the existence of de facto conditions is
6
generally viewed as not constituting a denial of equal protection. 0
The de jure/governmental action limitation of Brown II has prevailed 6 1 and dominated the litigation in the area of public school segregation, although the Supreme Court has never explicitly sanctioned this
view. After Brown II it was assumed that the elimination of unconstitutional provisions was sufficient to purge the school authorities of responsibility for segregation. In 1968, however, the Court expanded the duties
of a school district in Green v. County School Board. 62 Not only were the
segregatory governmental actions unconstitutional, but the Court found
that the resultant segregatory conditions were now also unconstitutional.
In a sharply critical opinion written for the majority Justice Brennan
63
placed an affirmative duty on school officials to integrate.
As a result of Green, local school boards faced a new dilemma.
Although certain segregatory conditions were now unconstitutional, there
were no guidelines to differentiate between impermissible de jure conditions and the constitutionally acceptable de facto varieties. Judicial in57. 347 U.S. at 495. The Court never explicitly invalidated the "separate but equal"
has
doctrine, but merely concluded that "in the field of public education the doctrine ...
no place." Id.
58. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) [hereinafter referred to as Brown

I].
59. Id. at 298.
60. For a more detailed analysis of de facto school segregation and its ramifications,
see Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60
CALIF. L. REV. 275 (1972).

61. See, e.g., Schiro v. Bynum, 375 U.S. 395 (1964); Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61
(1963); Turner v. Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962); New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n
v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956); Holmes v. Atlanta,
350 U.S. 879 (1955); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955), aff'd per
curiam, 350 U.S. 877 (1955); Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954).
62. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
63. School boards such as the respondents then operating state-compelled dual
systems were nevertheless clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take
whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial
discrimination would be eliminated root and branch.
Id. at 437-38.

quiry then focused on the existence of a causal relationship between some
discriminatory governmental action and the segregatory conditions.
While the Court addressed the issue in Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg
Board of Education,64 it did little to clarify the standards. In his opinion
for the Court, Chief Justice Burger implied that the presence of "any
discriminatory action by the school authorities" would be sufficient to
render the resulting conditions unconstitutional. He left open the consequences of a finding of segregatory conditions when actions that were not
65
discriminatory had been taken by the school board.
The Supreme Court applied the disproportionate impact doctrine
directly to school desegregation in Wright v. Council of Emporia.' 6 The
city council proposed to withdraw its schools from a county system that
had previously been directed to desegregate. Justice Stewart, writing for
the sharply divided Court, 67 relied solely on an "effect" analysis.
[W]e have focused upon the effect-not the purpose or motivation-of a school board's actions in determining whether it is a
permissible method of dismantling a dual system. The existence
of a permissible purpose cannot sustain an action that has an
impermissible effect.'
The controversy over the de jure-de facto distinction 69 culminated in
Keyes v. School DistrictNo. 1,70 in which the Court was confronted for
the first time with a segregated school district that had not previously
been legislatively mandated. This so-called "northern" pattern of school
segregation exists when racially segregated residential patterns and neighborhood school attendance policies result in racially segregated public
schools. 71 The district court 72 found that the school authorities had engaged in intentional segregation of schools in one section of the district
64. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
65. "We do not reach in this case the question whether a showing that school
segregation is a consequence of other types of state action, without any discriminatory
action by the school authorities, is a constitutional violation requiring remedial action by a
school desegregation decree." 402 U.S. at 23.
66. 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
67. Justices Douglas, Brennan, White and Marshall completed the majority with
Justices Burger, Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist dissenting.
68. Id. at 462 (emphasis added).
69. Some circuits had already abrogated the. de facto/de jure distinction. The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Indep. School Dist., 467 F.2d 142
(5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 922 (1973), found that the rigid imposition of a
neighborhood school plan by a school board upon an historic de facto pattern of residential
segregation, thus necessarily creating similar patterns of school segregation, was unconstitutional.
Discriminatory motive and purpose, while they may reinforce a finding of
effective segregation, are not necessary ingredients of constitutional violations in
the field of public education. We, therefore, hold that racial and ethnic segregation that exists in the Corpus Christi school system is unconstitutional, not de
facto, not de jure, but unconstitutional.
Id. at 149.
70. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
71. For an interesting discussion of this type of segregation, see Kaplan, Segregation
Litigation and the Schools-PartH: The General Northern Problem, 58 N.W.U.L. REV. 157
(1963).
72. 303 F. Supp. 277 (D. Colo. 1969).

despite the absence of an explicit statutory mandate 73 and fashioned a
remedy for the illegal action. The lower court still required the plaintiffs
to establish de jure segregation in the remaining areas of the district for a
broader remedy. The Supreme Court, however, held that a finding of
intentionally segregative school board actions in a meaningful portion of
a school district established a prima facie case of unlawful segregative
design on the part of school authorities. The burden then shifted to those
authorities to prove that segregated schools within the system were not
the result of intentional segregative actions. 74 Thus, once the evidence
established that a portion of a school district was illegally segregated, the
plaintiffs needed only to show de facto segregation in another portion of
the district to shift the burden. The Supreme Court also re-emphasized the
de jure-de facto distinction. Justice Brennan, in his majority opinion,
found that the district court had looked for "a purpose or intent to
discriminate" 75 and had therefore maintained the distinction. The Court
claimed that the school authorities were neither able to "adduce proof
sufficient to support a finding that segregative intent was not among the
factors that motivated their action" 76 nor to show "that its past segregative acts did not create or contribute to the current segregated condition of
77
the core city schools."
Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion in Keyes ,78 argued strongly for the abrogation of the de jure-de facto distinction and in its place
advocated an analysis focused on the "effect" of existing conditions.
Contending that the lack of progress in desegregating school systems
outside the southern states was a result of the de jure-de facto distinction,
he insisted, "In my view we should abandon a distinction which long
since has outlived its time and formulate Constitutional principles of
national rather than merely regional application." 79 Powell canvassed the
Court's school segregation decisions from Brown I through Swann80 and
concluded that the Court had imposed obligations on southern school
districts that it had not imposed on northern districts because of the de
jure-de facto distinction. The difference in treatment was untenable, he
claimed, when the effects were the same. 81 In place of the dichotomy,
73. "[The school system] has never been operated under a constitutional or statutory
provision that mandated or permitted racial segregation in public education." 413 U.S. at
191.
74. Id.at 208.
75. Id.at 193, 208.
76. Id.at 210.
77. Id. at 211.
78. Id. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
79. Id. at 219.
80. Id. at 219-23.
81. Id. at 226. For other arguments that the same standards should be applied in the
North as in the South, see Dimond, School Segregation in the North: There is But One
Constitution, 7 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. I (1972); Karst, Not One Law at Rome and
Another at Athens: The Fourteenth Amendment in Nationwide Application, 1972 WASH.

L.Q. 383.

Powell formulated a two-tier approach. Under this test, a prima facie case
is established by statistics showing segregation if "a substantial percentage of schools [is] populated by students from one race only or predominantly so populated."2 The burden then shifts to the school authorities
"to demonstrate they nevertheless are operating a genuinely integrated
school system." 83 Essentially Justice Powell adopted a disproportionate
impact analysis to determine if the school authorities were properly
performing their equal protection duties.
Justice Powell scored a major victory in his quest for the abrogation
of the de jure-de facto distinction two years later in the Supreme Court's
Milliken v. Bradley8l decision. The case is best known for limiting the
Swann remedies of extensive busing in metropolitan Detroit school
districts .85 The Court held that it was improper to order cross-district
busing when there was not a finding of segregation in each school
district.86 The Court also affirmed the district court's findings that
focused on the practices that Justice Powell had thought relevant in his
Keyes opinion.8 7 More importantly, the Chief Justice, writing for the
Court, appeared to accept Justice Powell's prima facie doctrine.
Disparity in the racial composition of pupils within a single
district may well constitute a 'signal' to a district court at the
outset, leading to inquiry into the causes accounting for a pronounced racial identifiability of schools within one school
system.88
The difference between Chief Justice Burger's prima facie requirements
and Justice Powell's standard was minimal. Essentially, Bradley structured school segregation litigation as a two-step process. Plaintiffs could
establish a prima facie case against school officials by showing that the
schools were significantly racially identifiable. The burden of proof then
shifted to school authorities to show that they could not have implement82. 413 U.S. at 224 n.10.
83. Id. at 224. To carry their burden, the school authorities must show that, for the
system as a whole, they had taken appropriate steps to
(i) integrate faculties and administration; (ii) scrupulously assure equality of
facilities, instruction, and curriculum opportunities throughout the district; (iii)
utilize their authority to draw attendance zones to promote integration; and (iv)
locate new schools, close old ones, and determine the size and grade categories
with this same objective in mind. Where school authorities decide to undertake
the transportation of students, this also must be with integrative opportunities in
mind.
Id. at 226.
84. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). Justice Stewart concurred, while Justices Douglas, Brennan,
White, and Marshall dissented. On appeal from remand the Supreme Court held inter alia
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in approving the remedial education plan.
97 S. Ct. 2749 (1977).
85. See Connolly, Milliken v. Bradley: The Dilemma of De Jure Segregation in Black
Majority School Districts, 6 COLUM. H.R. L. REV. 567 (1974-75).
86. The Court did set out the possible situations in which interdistrict busing remedies
would be allowed: "an interdistrict remedy might be in order when the racially discriminatory acts of one or more school districts caused racial segregation in an adjoining district, or
where district lines have been deliberately drawn on the basis of race." 418 U.S. at 745.
87. See note 83 supra.
88. 418 U.S. at 741 n.19.

ed their policies in such a way as to lessen segregation or that they did
everything possible to promote integration. 89
In a more recent desegregation case 90 the Court overturned a Seventh
Circuit decision that had ordered interdistrict busing in Indianapolis. The
Supreme Court remanded the case in light of its earlier decisions 9' that
required a showing of purposeful intent to segregate. Because the disproportionate impact analysis has been de-emphasized in school desegregation cases as well as in other areas of the law, the plaintiff once again has
the difficult, if not overwhelming, burden of showing that the school
authorities had a purpose or intent to segregate the schools.92
III.

The De-Emphasis of the Disproportionate Impact Analysis

A.

Washington v. Davis

The most significant Supreme Court decision addressing the relative
importance of the disproportionate impact analysis was the 1976 decision, Washington v. Davis. 93 Black applicants to the District of Columbia police force challenged hiring procedures that required applicants to
pass a written personnel test designed to measure verbal skills. The
plaintiffs offered statistical evidence that a significantly higher percentage
of Negroes than whites failed the test. They claimed that the disparity
constituted racial discrimination in violation of the due process clause of
the fifth amendment, a federal civil rights statute, 94 and a District of
Columbia statute. 95
The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, 96 but the court of appeals reversed9 7 and directed the grant of
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed
the court of appeals, as seven members held that the test violated neither
89. This shifting of the burden of proof is justifiable because the school district has
better access than the plaintiffs to the true reasons underlying the tremendous number of
decisions that determine the extent of school segregation. For example, the location of new
schools, the assignment of teachers and staff, and the drawing of attendance zones are
decisions made by the school authorities and should be justified by them.
90. United States v. Board of School Com'rs of Indianapolis, 541 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir.
1976), rev'd and remanded, 96 S. Ct. 800 (1977).
91. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
92. The difficulty of showing such an intent is recognized by leading civil rights
advocates. Jack Greenberg, director of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
Inc., claims that "the requirement that one prove a purpose to discriminate is exceedingly
difficult to meet and would make it impossible to prevail in many civil rights cases."
Dreifus, An Interview with Jack Greenberg-A Satisfied Mind, 3 JURts DOCTOR 25, 30
(March 1977).
93. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
95. Section 1-320 of the District of Columbia Code provides,
In any program of recruitment, or hiring of individuals to fill positions in the
government of the District of Columbia, no officer or employee of the government of the District of Columbia shall exclude or give preference to the residents
of the District of Columbia or any State of the United States on the basis of
residence, religion, race, color or natural origin.
96. 348 F. Supp. 15 (D.D.C. 1972).
97. 168 U.S. App. D.C. 42, 512 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

the due process clause of the fifth amendment and its equal protection
98
component nor any statute.
99
The Supreme Court rejected the application of Title VII standards
to the constitutional issue' °° and then proceeded to discuss the equal
protection clause and its purposes. At the outset the Court rejected the
proposition that disproportionate impact alone was sufficient to invalidate
a law or other official act.10 1
Justice White, writing for the Court, briefly reviewed several of the
Court's previous equal protection decisions1 2 that illustrated "the basic
equal protection principle that the invidious quality of a law claimed to be
racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose." 10 3 Furthermore, "to the extent that those cases which
rested on or expressed the view that proof of discriminatory racial purpose is unnecessary in making out an equal protection violation, we are in
disagreement." 1 04 Justice White was referring to lower court decisions
that had interpreted the Supreme Court's position.
Examining the written personnel test itself, the Court found that it
was neutral on its face and rationally related to the constitutionally
permissible governmental interest in upgrading the literacy of the police
force. 0 5 The fact that blacks had a higher failure rate than whites had
little significance for the majority. "Respondents, as Negroes, could no
more successfully claim that the test denied them equal protection than
98. Justice White accepted the assumption of both lower courts and of the parties that
standards "similar to those obtaining under Title VII governed" and proceeded to find that,
under those standards, the test had been validated.
99. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1970). The standards the Court was referring to were
interpreted in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The Court there held that
employment tests that disproportionately disadvantaged minorities had to be demonstrably
related to job performance.
100. "We have never held that the constitutional standard for adjudicating claims of
invidious racial discrimination is identical to the standards applicable under Title VII and we
decline to do so today." 426 U.S. at 239.
101. "But our cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official act,
without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional
solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact." Id. at 239.
102. See 426 U.S. at 239-41, where the Court discusses Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,
413 U.S. 189 (1973); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Wright v. Council of
Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971); Wright v.
Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
103. 426 U.S. at 240.
104. Id. at 245. In note 12 the Court listed those lower court cases it felt were
incorrectly decided. Among those cited was Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v.
Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1974), a case in which the Court had
granted certiorari, 423 U.S. 1030 (1975). In his dissent, Justice Brennan criticized the
majority for having thereby "effectively reversed" a case in which certiorari had been
granted. 426 U.S. at 258 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens refused to express
any opinion on the merits of these cases. Id. at 256 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Also on this "laundry" list were Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir.
1971), aff'd on hearing en banc, 461 F.2d 1171 (1972); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n., Inc. v.
City of Lackawana, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1970); Southern
Alameda Spanish Speaking Org. v. City of Union City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970).
105. 426 U.S. at 245-56.

could white applicants who also failed.' ' 0 6 The proper role of the
disproportionate impact doctrine, the Court continued, is as evidence
tending to prove wrongful motivation. 107 The weight to be assigned to
this evidence remains unclear. It would appear that in proper circumstances statistical evidence of disproportionate impact would be sufficient
to shift the burden of proof to the defendant to show lack of purposeful
discrimination. The Washington court did not explicitly allocate the
burden in this manner, but it did find that the defendant had introduced
sufficient evidence to negate any inference that the police department had
108
discriminated on the basis of race.
B.

Other Limitations on the DisproportionateImpact Analysis

1. Basis of Washington Doctrine.-Washington is not without
support from previous Supreme Court decisions. On several other occasions the Court has failed to consider disproportionate impact as proof of
a prima facie case or a per se equal protection violation. A California
constitutional amendment that required referendum approval for any low
rent housing project was challenged by prospective black tenants on the
grounds that it was racially discriminatory because more blacks than
whites would be adversely affected. In James v. Valtierra109the Court
refused to hold that such a disparity constituted discrimination in violation of the fourteenth amendment.
The Article requires referendum approval for any low-rent
public housing project, not only for projects which will be
occupied by a racial minority. And the record here would not
support any claim that a law seemingly neutral on its face is in
fact aimed at a racial minority."10
Writing for the Court, Justice Black distinguished Hunter v. Erickson."'
The invalidated provision in Hunter required referendum approval for
any ordinances regulating racial discrimination in real estate transactions,
while no other housing ordinances were subject to the referendum requirement. In James there was no such impermissible racial classification
implicit in the challenged referendum requirement." 2
Relying on a disproportionate impact analysis, Texas welfare recipients in Jefferson v. Hackney" 3 demonstrated that the state welfare
106. Id. This is particularly significant in light of the Court's earlier view that when
members of "discrete and insular minorities" (United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304
U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)) are adversely affected, careful judicial scrutiny of the rationales
underlying the decision is required. See Bell, Judicial Protection of Powerless Minorities, 59
IOwA 1059 (1974).

107.

426 U.S. at 242.

108. Id.at 246.
109. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
110. Id.at 141.
Ill. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
112. Justices Marshall, Brennan and Blackmun dissented on the grounds that the
statute invidiously discriminated against the poor, a suspect class, in that a referendum is
unnecessary for housing projects other than low income housing.
113. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).

scheme provided one hundred percent of the "standard of need" to
eligible aged persons, ninety-five percent for those eligible for blind or
disability benefits, but only seventy-five percent for those families eligible for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). 114 Because
black and Mexican-Americans comprised a larger percentage of AFDC
recipients than of the other categories, as a group they received fewer
benefits. The Supreme Court refused to hold the state's plan unconstitutionalon a "naked statistical argument"" 5 that demonstrated a disproportionate impact." 6 In his majority opinion in Washington, Justice
White cited Jefferson" 7 for the proposition that the Court had never
invalidated a law or official act solely on the grounds of disproportionate
impact.'
The refusal to employ the disproportionate impact analysis in challenges based on racial discrimination has led to some dissension in the
Court. In Wright v. Rockefeller" 9 the New York Legislature had redrawn congressional districts so that one district was practically all white
and the others were predominantly non-white. Sustaining the legislature's
action, the Court held that the plaintiffs had failed to show that the
legislature was either motivated by racial considerations or in fact drew
the districts along racial lines. 20 The dissenters, Justices Douglas and
Goldberg, argued that the effect established a per se prima facie case of
legislative purpose to discriminate. 2 ' They theorized that the burden of
114. Id. at 537 n.3.
115. Appellants are thus left with their naked statistical argument: that there is a
larger percentage of Negroes and Mexican-Americans in AFDC that in the other
programs, and that the AFDC is funded at 75% whereas the other programs are
funded at 95% and 100% of recognized need. . . .The basic outlines of eligibility
for the various categorical grants are established by Congress, not by the States,
given the heterogeneity of the Nation's population, it would be only an infrequent
coincidence that the racial composition of each grant class was identical to that of
the others. The acceptance of appellants' constitutional theory would render
suspect each difference in treatment among the grant classes, however lacking in
racial motivation and however otherwise rational the treatment might be.
Id.at 548.
116. The Court also relied on its decision in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
A Maryland welfare provision that set maximum benefits for aid to families with dependent
children was challenged on the basis that it disadvantaged large families. The Court upheld
the provision on the grounds that the fund was limited and the state need not choose
between attacking some particular aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all.
117. 406 U.S. 535, 548 (1972), cited at 426 U.S. 241 (1976).
118. In Tyler v.Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1975), the Fifth Circuit relied on both
James and Jefferson to refrain from applying the strict scrutiny standard to an equal
protection challenge to the Georgia bar exam. The Court said
The gravamen of [plaintiff's] argument is that the disproportionate passing rates
of black and white applicants on the examination serve to create the classification
judicial scrutiny. The difficulty
based on race which isneeded to trigger strict
with this position, however, is that itstands in the face of a clear body of law
holding that an otherwise legitimate classification does not become constitutionally "suspect" simply because greater members of a racial minority fall in the group
disadvantaged by the classification.
Id.at 1099.
119. 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
120. Id. at 56.
121. Id. at 61 (Douglas, J.,dissenting).

proof should have then shifted to the defendant, since the requirement
that plaintiff show an illicit motivation on the part of the legislature was
22
an impossible burden.1
In further support of the Court's position in Washington, the majority cited Akins v. Texas, 123 a 1945 jury discrimination case in which the
Court refused to rule that the jury commissioners had discriminated on the
basis of race in their panel selections. The majority held that " a purpose
to discriminate must be present which may be proven by systematic
exclusion of eligible jurymen of the proscribed race or by unequal
application of the law to such an extent as to show intentional discrimination." 124 The participation of one Negro on the grand jury that had
indicted the petitioners was apparently sufficient to satisfy the majority
that Negroes had not been systematically excluded. The dissent, however, relied on testimony by the commissioner that he had intended to put
only one Negro on the panel. This admission, as far as the dissent was
concerned, was proof of discriminatory motive; therefore, the commissioners' action violated equal protection because they had refused to be
color-blind in their selection procedures.' 25 The majority decision in
Akins seems to indicate that not only was the Court unpersuaded by the
"effect" analysis, but was looking for proof of unconstitutional motivation far in excess of what the plaintiff could provide.
2. Application of Washington -The doctrine of Washington was
applied full force to an important housing case early this year. In Village
of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. ,126
the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal's holding that the city's
denial of zoning for an integrated low income housing project violated the
fourteenth amendment equal protection clause.1 27 The decision came as
122. Id. at 74 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
123. 325 U.S. 398 (1945).
124. Id. at 403-04.
125. Id. at 410 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
126. 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977) (citation omitted).
127. The case was remanded for consideration of plaintiffs' claim under Title VIII of the
Civil Rights Act (Fair Housing Act). On remand, the circuit court faced the problem of
interpreting the Act's prohibition against denying a person a dwelling "because of race."
Under a narrow view, the court reasoned, a party cannot commit an act "because of race"
unless he intends to discriminate between races. The more liberal view is that a party
commits an act "because of race" whenever the natural and foreseeable consequence of
that act is to discriminate between races, regardless of intent. The court then stated that
although the Supreme Court had adopted the narrow view for equal protection purposes in
Washington, it had reaffirmed the use of the broad view for Title VII cases. The circuit
court then likened the two statutes on the grounds of their similar purpose and concluded
that the broad view of what constitutes racial discrimination was equally applicable to the
Fair Housing Act. "Conduct that has the necessary and foreseeable consequence of perpetuating segregation can be as deleterious as purposefully discriminatory conduct in
frustrating the national [goal]." 558 F.2d 1283, 1289 (7th Cir. 1977).
The court refused to formulate a rule that would make the finding of discriminatory
effect a per se violation of the Act and instead adopted a four-factor inquiry to determine
under which circumstances conduct that resulted in a disproportionate impact would violate
the Act. The critical elements are as follows: (I) the strength of plaintiff's showing of

no surprise, however, since the Court had previously expressed disapproval of the lower court's holding in a footnote to its Washington
decision. 128
The district court in Arlington Heights129 had upheld the city's
decision, concluding that the denial was motivated by a desire to protect
property values and not to discriminate. While the court of appeals
accepted the finding of no intent to discriminate, it reversed because the
ultimate effect of the rezoning denial was racially discriminatory. 130 The
Supreme Court, relying on Washington, held that proof of a racially
discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the
equal protection clause and that the plaintiffs had failed to carry the
burden of proving that discriminatory intent was a motivating factor in the
denial of the zoning request. "Our decision in Washington v. Davis
solely
made it clear that an official action will not be held unconstitutional
13
'
impact.'
disproportionate
racially
a
in
because it results
The Court clarified the Washington doctrine by listing the elements
that could evidence a racially discriminatory intent. Among them were:
(1) disproportionate impact, (2) the historical background of the challenged decision,' 32 (3) the specific antecedent events, 133 (4) departures from
normal procedures,' 34 and (5) contemporary statements of the decision
makers. 135 The Court then clarified its position on the allocation of the
burdens of proof:
Proof that the decision by the Village was motivated in part by a
racially discriminatory purpose would not necessarily have required invalidation of the challenged decision. Such proof
would, however, have shifted to the Village the burden of
establishing that the same decision would have resulted even
had the impermissible purpose not been considered. If this were
established, the complaining party in a case of this kind no
longer fairly could attribute the injury complained of to improdiscriminatory effect; (2) some evidence of discriminatory intent; (3) the defendant's interest in taking the action complained of; and (4) the plaintiffs' efforts to compel the defendant
to affirmatively provide housing for members of minority groups or to merely restrain the
defendant from interfering with individual property owners who wish to provide such
housing.
In the case at bar, the court remanded the case to the district court with orders to
determine whether there is land other than the disputed property that is both properly zoned
and suitable for federally subsidized low-cost housing. The nonexistence of such alternative
property would render the village's refusal to rezone a violation of the Fair Housing Act.
128. 426 U.S. 229, 269 n.12 (1976).
1974).
129. 372 F. Supp. 208 (N.D. I11.
130. 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975).
131. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
132. The Court cited Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Lane v.
Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala.), aff'd per curiam,
336 U.S. 933 (1949).
133. The Court cited Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 373-76 (1967); Grosjeon v.
American Press, 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawana, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); Progress Dev. Corp. v.
Mitchell, 286 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1961).
134. The Court cited Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970).
135. 429 U.S. at 267-68.

per consideration of a discriminatory purpose. In such circumstances, there would be no justification
for judicial interference
36
with the challenged decision.
Redefining the burden of proof, the Court once again required a
showing of discriminatory purpose. Because this is substantially more
difficult than showing disproportionate impact, municipalities are more
free to adopt racially discriminatory policies and justify them by a mere
showing that illegal purpose was not their sole motive.
In United States v. Board of School Commissioners of In3 7 the city annexed the suburbs surrounding it but retained
dianapolisI
the
former school district boundaries. The effect was to confine almost all
black students to the city schools while the suburban schools within the
governmental unit were predominantly white. The school district attempted to justify its decision to maintain the separate school districts on the
grounds that a consolidated school district would be large and would
result in a loss of citizen participation and a tax increase. The circuit court
held that "[t]hese considerations, although apparently not racially
motivated, cannot justify legislation that has an obvious racial segregative
impact." 38

The dissent, which proved to be correctly farsighted, claimed that a
violation of the equal protection clause depends on the existence of a
racially

discriminatory

purpose.13 9

"Disproportionate

effect

on

minorities without discriminatory purpose is not enough."'140 The Supreme Court agreed with the dissent's position and remanded the case for
reconsideration in light of Washington and Arlington Heights.141
IV.

The Future of the Disproportionate Impact Analysis

While the Arlington Heights decision added some clarity to the
Washington doctrine, the role of the disproportionate impact analysis is
still uncertain. A demonstration of disparity in effect will not suffice to
establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination, but the role it will
play in establishing discriminatory purpose is not so clear.
In his concurring opinion in Washington, Justice Stevens concluded
that
136. Id. at 270 n. 21.
137. 541 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1976).
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the line between discriminatory purpose and discriminatory
impact is not nearly as bright, and perhaps not quite as critical,
as the reader of the Court's opinion might assume. I agree, of
course, that a constitutional issue does not arise everytime
some disproportionate impact is shown. On the other hand,
when the disproportion is as dramatic as in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, or Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, it
really does not matter 42whether the standard is phrased in terms
of purpose or effect.
Thus, for at least one member of the Court, a showing of grossly
disproportionate impact, when it is difficult to show any other evidence of
illicit motive, would suffice to at least shift the burden of proof to the
defendant. Because the defendant has greater access to direct evidence of
motivation, he should be required to rebut the inference of impermissible
motivation.
The appropriate allocation of the burden of proof was also considered by Justice Stevens when he said,
Although it may be proper to use the same language to describe
the constitutional claim in each of these contexts, the burden of
proving a prima facie case may well involve differing evidentiary considerations. The extent of deference that one pays to
the trial court's determination of the factual issue, and indeed,
the extent to which one characterizes the intent issue as a
question of fact or a question of law, will vary in different
contexts.
Frequently the most probative evidence of intent will be
objective evidence of what actually happened rather than evidence describing the subjective state of mind of the actor. For
normally the actor is presumed to have intended the natural
consequences of his deeds. This is particularly true in the case
of governmental action which is frequently the product of compromise, of collective decisionmaking, and of mixed motivation. 143
Stevens' approach is one realistic method of addressing an equal
protection standard dependent on a showing of racially discriminatory
purpose. If the purpose is to serve as a standard for judicial decisions
there must be objective criteria for establishing it, rather than a subjective
search into the mind of the defendant.
The need to assign some weight to proof of disproportionate impact
is apparent. Decisions producing such results are likely to have been in
fact discriminatorily motivated. Furthermore, more direct evidence of
illegal motive is often difficult or impossible to establish.
V.

Conclusion

The disproportionate impact doctrine, after brief acceptance by the
Court as a means of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination, has been equivocally repudiated in recent cases. The device was of
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great importance to those asserting racial discrimination because of the
difficulty of proving racially motivated discrimination by other means. It
served as a safeguard against improper race-dependent decisions by
shifting the burden to the defendant to show that his actions were in fact
not illegally motivated. If the doctrine is to remain useful, it must be
combined with other factors tending to show discriminatory purpose. In
some instances the plaintiff could show that no other legitimate motive
could account for the defendant's action. In addition the character of the
analysis must change from creating a conclusive presumption of illegal
discrimination to a rebuttable one. Some use of the analysis as a means of
proving racial discrimination is essential to eliminate all vestiges of
discrimination.
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